A coupon represents the right to claim some service which is typically offered by vendors. In practice, issuing bundled multi-coupons is more efficient than issuing single coupons separately. The diversity of interests of the parties involved in a coupon system demands additional security properties beyond the common requirements (e.g., unforgeability). Customers wish to preserve their privacy when using the multi-coupon bundle and to prevent vendors from profiling. Vendors are interested in establishing a long-term customer relationship and not to subsidise one-time customers, since coupons are cheaper than the regular price. We propose a secure multi-coupon system that allows users to redeem a predefined number of single coupons from the same multi-coupon. The system provides unlinkability and also hides the number of remaining coupons of a multi-coupon from the vendor. In the coupon system, a method used might be of independent interest. It proves knowledge of a signature on a message tuple of which a single message can be revealed while the remaining elements of the tuple, the index of the revealed message, as well as the signature remain hidden.
Introduction
Today, coupons appear to be useful means for vendors to attract the attention of potential customers. Usually, coupons give the customer a financial incentive to purchase at a specific vendor. The purpose of coupons is many-fold. For instance, they can be used to draw the attention of customers to a newly opened shop or to prevent customers from buying at a competitor's shop [29] . Of course, coupons can also be purchased by customers, e.g., gift certificates. Even drug prescriptions from a doctor can be seen as a kind of a coupon.
In general, a coupon is a representation of the right to claim some good or service, usually from the party that issued the coupon. The types of coupons mentioned before can, in general, be redeemed only once, i.e., the coupon is invalidated after the service or good has been claimed. However, there are also coupons which can be redeemed more than once, such as a coupon book of a movie theater, where customers pay, e.g., for 9 movies and are entitled to see 10 . We call such coupons multi-coupons. In this paper, we are particularly interested in this type of coupons.
Typically, a real-world multi-coupon of value m is devalued by crossing out some field or by detaching a part of it. Offering such coupons can be beneficial for the issuing party, e.g., a movie theater. First, customers pay in advance for services or goods they have not claimed yet. Second, they are locked-in by the issuer/vendor, i.e., they will most likely not switch to another vendor to purchase the same or similar service or good as long as they have not redeemed all their coupons. Hence, multi-coupons can also be seen as a kind of loyalty program since they are specific to some vendor and induce loyalty, at least, as long as the customer has coupons left to spend.
Clearly, vendors are interested in creating loyalty and hence, it is likely that we are going to see such coupon systems in the Internet, too. In fact, introducing such a coupon system might be even more valuable to Internet vendors than to their realworld counterparts. Since, from the customers' viewpoint, a priori all vendors, offering a certain good or service, look alike and can be reached as easily as their competitors. This is in contrast to the real world where time and effort is required to go to physical stores to acquire information on that store's products [23] . In the real world, additional barriers may exist, such as physical distance or some kind of relationship to shop personnel, that incur indirect switching costs for customers [21] . In summary, it can be expected that in absence of notable switching costs customer fluctuation is higher in the Internet than in the real world because there is little that keeps customers from buying at a competitor's site whenever this competitor offers a better price. Thus, it is in the vendor's interest to introduce switching costs in order to retain an installed base of customers [30] .
Desirable Properties for Coupon Systems
At first, introducing a coupon system looks like a win-win situation, since both parties seem to benefit from such a coupon system. Vendors have a means to create a loyal customer base and customers value the financial benefit provided by coupons. However, since a customer normally redeems her coupons in different transactions, a multi-coupon can be used as a means to link transactions, and thus, to allow a vendor to create a record of the customer's past purchases. Such customer information might be exploited for data mining, to infer new customer data, customer profiling, promotion of new products, price discrimination, etc. [24] . Thus, if through usage of the coupon system customers expect a misuse of their personal data, e.g., by using it to create profiles for price discrimination [16] , they are more likely to decline the coupon system. According to [19, 20] privacy is a concern to Internet users, especially when it comes to electronic commerce scenarios. Hence, a prudent vendor should take these concerns into account when planning to offer a coupon system.
In order to rule out privacy concerns of customers from the start, vendors might want to introduce a coupon system that does not infringe their customers' privacy. Thus, a coupon should disclose as little information as possible. For instance, a multi-coupon should only give vendors an indication that it is still valid, i.e., that at least one coupon is not spent, instead of disclosing the number of unspent coupons. Such a property could be useful in sensitive areas, e.g., in health care scenarios, where a multi-coupon can be used as a prescription for a certain number of doses of some medicine. In this case, the pharmacist would deduct a single coupon from the multi-coupon and may only detect if the prescription has been used up. Also in welfare, paper-based checks or food stamps could be replaced by electronic coupons. In fact, recently, the U.S. announced to replace their paper-based food stamp program with electronic benefits and debit cards [26] . However, this electronic program does not protect the privacy of recipients, since the cards are processed similar to ordinary debit cards.
For vendors, in addition to common security requirements such as unforgeability, there are other requirements which are specific to a coupon system. As mentioned before, a vendor's driving reason for offering a coupon system is to establish a long term relationship with customers. However, customers may be interested in sharing a multicoupon, i.e., each customer obtains and redeems a fraction of the coupons in the multicoupon. Moreover, this behaviour allows them, e.g., to sell coupons on an individual basis for a cheaper price 5 , e.g., to one-time customers who otherwise would have purchased full-price services or goods. Thus, ideally, vendors wish to prevent customers from splitting their coupons.
To illustrate splitting, we consider the following variants as examples of real-world multi-coupons. The first variant, being a coupon book with detachable coupons and the second one being a multi-coupon where spent coupons are crossed out, i.e., coupons cannot be detached. The coupon book can be easily shared by a group of customers, since each customer can detach its share of coupons from the coupon book and each coupon may be redeemed independently by a different customer. In the second variant, the multi-coupon must be given to the vendor as a whole to allow him to devalue, i.e., cross out, the redeemed coupon. Hence, in this variant, individual coupons cannot be split and redeemed separately and independently as in the first variant.
Nevertheless, even in the multi-coupon scenario with non-detachable coupons some kind of sharing is possible if we transfer it to the digital world. Since digital coupons can be easily copied, colluding customers may jointly purchase a multi-coupon, distribute copies of it among each other, and agree to redeem only the share of the coupon for which each of them paid for. In this scenario, however, customers have to fully trust each other that none of them redeems more than its share of coupons. Since each of the colluders owns a copy of the multi-coupon this means that every colluder has full control of all single coupons. Hence, each of them could redeem single coupons of other colluders without their knowledge. A colluder deceived in such a way would only learn about it when he or she tries to redeem a single coupon and the vendor rejects it because it was already spent. Thus, it seems less likely that multi-coupons are traded between customers.
In this context another possible scenario with multi-coupons is the case where trust is only one-way. If customer A buys a multi-coupon, uses up, say, half of the coupons and sells the remaining half of the coupons to customer B then A does not have to trust B. Only B has to trust A that he indeed received the purported half of the coupons. There is nothing that really can stop A from doing so, neither in a real-world scenario with paper coupons nor in the digital scenario, unless (a) the multi-coupon contains information that ties it to A's identity and which the vendor may verify (b) customer A has a strong incentive to keep the multi-coupon, e.g., because some private and/or "valuable" information is encoded into the multi-coupon.
We do not pursue any of these two approaches since, first, we do not want to identify customers because this may violate their privacy and, second, encoding valuable information seems to be unsatisfactory as well because encoding a "valuable" secret implies that such a secret exists and that a customer is willing to encode it into a, potentially, considerably less valuable multi-coupon. Instead, we employ all-or-nothing sharing which has been used in other works before [3, 8] to discourage users from sharing / disclosing certain data, such as private credential information.
In case of a multi-coupon, all-or-nothing means that a customer cannot give away or sell any single coupon from its multi-coupon without giving away all other single coupons -this includes used and unused single coupons alike. Therefore, our scheme is comparable with the real-world multi-coupon example from above where used coupons are crossed out. The difference is that in the digital world one may effortlessly create identical copies of a multi-coupon while in the real world creating exact hardcopies of such a coupon may require some effort.
Overview of Our Coupon System
The coupon system proposed here can be viewed as a digital counterpart to the realworld multi-coupon with non-detachable coupons, as mentioned before. In our coupon system, a multi-coupon M is a signature on a tuple X where X = (x 1 , . . . , x m ). In the system specification, we denote a multiple set of coupons by M and a single coupon by x ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x m }.
In the coupon issue phase, a user first convinces a vendor that she knows X without revealing the values of X. Then, the verifier issues the coupon M by "blindly" signing X, i.e., M := Sign(X), and sending M to the user. Here we make use of the Camenisch and Lysyanskaya (CL) signature scheme [9] .
When redeeming a single coupon x, the user reveals x to the vendor and proves that she is in possession of a valid multi-coupon M = Sign(X) and x ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x m }. The vendor then checks if x is in a list of used coupons. If it is not, the vendor accepts x and puts it in the list. Beside satisfying common security requirements, the scheme has the following properties: The vendor is not able to trace x back to M or to link two redemptions since M is never given back to the vendor and the single coupons x are independent of each other. Furthermore, the vendor does not learn anything about the status of the multi-coupon, i.e., how many single coupons are left in the multi-coupon. Concerning the vendor's requirement, the scheme does not allow users to split a multicoupon without sharing all values (x 1 , . . . , x m ).
A method used in the coupon system might be of independent interest. It proves knowledge of the CL signature M on a message tuple X := (x 1 , . . . , x m ), of which an arbitrary single message x j can be revealed while the remaining elements of the tuple, the revealed message's index, j, and the signature M remain hidden.
At first it may seem that the coupon system can be easily realised using an existing payment system or credential system which supports m-showable credentials or at least one-showable credentials of which m can be obtained. However, none of these systems satisfied all the requirements of the coupon system we had in mind, or could only satisfy them in a rather inefficient way. In addition, some of the systems discussed below require the existence of a trusted third party to issue certificates of some sort. We do not have such a requirement.
The payment system of Chaum [11] as well as the one of Brands [2] use digital coins which can be anonymously spent. Withdrawal and spending of coins is roughly the same as issuance and redemption of single coupons. However, using m single-spendable digital coins as a multi-coupon easily allows splitting of the multi-coupon. Even if we would use multi-valued coins such that one unit of an m-coin can be spent and an m−1 coin is returned, we would still not have the coupon system that we have in mind, since the number of remaining coins is disclosed to the vendor. In the coin system of Ferguson [17] a multi-coin is introduced that can be spent m times. However, when paying with the same multi-coin the vendor learns the remaining value of the coin and, in addition, transactions are linkable.
Okamoto and Ohta [25] proposed a scheme which resembles our coupon system in the sense that they use a multiple blind signature to issue a "large" coin which is comprised of "smaller" coins, or rather, can be subdivided into smaller ones. However, subdividability in their system is considered a feature while in a coupon system this translates to splitting and, hence, is less desirable. In [12] and [31] , Chen and Verheul, respectively, proposed credential systems where the credentials are multi-showable, i.e., can be shown for an unlimited number of times. The credentials obtained through both systems are intended for pseudonymous usage, thus, our requirements for unlinkable redemptions and m-redeemability are not satisfied.
In the work of Brands [3] , attribute certificates were proposed that allow selective showing of individual attributes. These attributes are normally multi-showable but can be made m-showable, however, then different transactions become linkable. Persiano and Visconti [27] used some of the ideas of [3] to build a credential system which is multi-showable and does not allow to link different showings of a credential. Still, showings of credentials cannot be limited.
An anonymous credential system where credentials can be made one-showable was proposed by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [8] . Through this system, a user may obtain m one-show credentials which can be regarded as single coupons. However, this approach is not very efficient when used in a coupon system, since a credential generation protocol must be run for each credential and the credentials can be shared by different users and independently shown 6 . This means, when applied as a coupon system, coupons can be independently spent and splitting is easily possible.
The aspect of technically supporting loyalty in commercial applications has also been explored before. Maher [22] proposed a framework to introduce loyalty points, however, the privacy aspect was not an issue there. Enzmann et al. proposed a counter for a privacy-friendly, point-based loyalty system, where users anonymously obtained points for their purchases [15] . Finally, Wibowo et al. [32] proposed a loyalty system, however, based on pseudonyms, thus, providing a weaker form of privacy.
Model
The coupon system considered here involves mainly two parties, a customer U (user) and a vendor V. The system itself is comprised of an issue protocol and a redeem protocol which both are carried out between U and V. The result of the issue protocol is a multi-coupon M for U and the result of the redeem protocol is a spent single coupon for V and a multi-coupon devalued by one single coupon for U. Next, we state the main security requirements for the involved parties.
Requirements
In the following, we will use the notation M ; N to indicate that multi-coupon N is a successor of multi-coupon M . That is, N has strictly less coupons left to spent than M and both originate from the same initial multi-coupon. Given two multi-coupons M and N , if either M ; N or N ; M we say that M and N are related.
Unforgeability. It must be infeasible to create new multi-coupons, to increase the number of unspent coupons, or to reset the number of spent coupons.
Double-spending detection.
A vendor must be able to detect attempts of redeeming 'old' coupons that has already been redeemed. This means, given two runs of the redeem protocol, where a single coupon x is deducted from multi-coupon M and y is deducted from N , the vendor must be able to decide if x = y.
Redemption limitation. An m-redeemable coupon M may not be accepted by the vendor more than m times.
Protection against splitting. A coalition of customers U i should not be able to split an m-redeemable multi-coupon M into (disjoint) s i -redeemable shares M i with i s i ≤ m such that M i can only be redeemed by customer U i and none of the other customers U j , j = i, or a subset of them is able to redeem M i or a part of it. We call this property strong protection against splitting. However, we were unable to achieve such strong protection in this work.
Instead, our system only allows weak protection against splitting which means that splitting is possible, however, only if customers trust each other not to spent (part of) the other's share M i . Another way of putting this is to say that sharing M means sharing all m single coupons -we call this all-or-nothing-sharing 7 .
Unlinkability. It must be infeasible for vendors to link protocol runs of honest users. For this, we have to consider linking a run of an issue protocol to runs of corresponding redeem protocols and linking of any two redeem protocol runs.
(1) issue vs. redeem: Given a run of the issue protocol with output a multi-coupon M and given a redeem protocol run with output a devalued multi-coupon N , the vendor must not be able to decide if M ; N .
(2) redeem vs. redeem: Given two runs of the redeem protocol with output two multi-coupons M, N , the vendor must not be able to decide if M ; N or N ; M , i.e., he cannot tell if M and N are related or unrelated.
Minimum disclosure. As a result of a redeem protocol run, the vendor may only learn a single coupon redeemed but not the number of remaining coupons. This already follows from the unlinkability requirement but we make it explicit here, nevertheless.
Building Blocks
In order to illustrate our coupon system, we first introduce the employed technical building blocks.
Throughout the paper, we will use the following notational conventions. Let n = pq where p = 2p + 1, q = 2q + 1 and p , q , p, q are all primes. Denote the binary length of an integer I by I . We require p = n /2. We denote the set of residues modulo n that are relatively prime to n by Z * n and the set of quadratic residues modulo n by QR n , i.e., for all a ∈ QR n there exists b ∈ Z * n such that a ≡ b 2 mod n. By a ∈ R S we mean that a is chosen uniformly and at random from the set of integers S. For saving space, we omit the operation mod n in the following specifications.
Commitment Scheme
A commitment scheme is a two-party protocol between a committer C and a receiver R. In general, the scheme includes a Commit process and an Open process. In the first process, C computes a commitment C x with a message x, such that x cannot be changed without changing C x [4] . C then gives C x to R and keeps x secret. In the second process, C opens C x by revealing x.
The commitment scheme we employ is due to Damgård and Fujisaki (DF) [14] which is a generalization of the Fujisaki-Okamoto scheme [18] . We skip the basic DF scheme for committing to a single value x and proceed to the scheme where the commitment is to a message tuple (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ).
Let h denote the group generated by h ∈ R QR n , and let g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g m ∈ h . On secret input X := (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ), where x i ∈ [0, 2 x ), and public input PK := (g 1 , . . . , g m , h, n), the commitment is
, where r X ∈ R Z n are chosen at random.
Signature Scheme
The signature scheme stated in the following is a variant of the Camenisch and Lysyanskaya (CL) signature scheme [9] for signing a block of messages which was used before in [5] . The signed message is denoted by a tuple X := (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) where
x ), i = 1 . . . m and x is a parameter for the message length.
Key Generation. Set the modulus n as described before. Choose a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m , b, c ∈ R QR n and output a public key PK := (A, b, c, n) where A := (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m ) and a secret key SK := (p, q, n). e−1 ≥ e ≥ 2 e−1 + 2 e −1 . We denote this algorithm by: ind ← Verify (A,b,c,n) (X, v, e, s), where ind ∈ {accept, reject}.
Signing. On input

Remark 1.
The CL signature scheme is separable, i.e., the signature (v, e, s) on X is also the signature on a sub-tuple of X if we change the public key accordingly. In the following, we use the notation X\(x j ) to denote the sub-tuple of X which is comprised of all of X's components but its j-th one, i.e., X\(x j ) = (x 1 , . . . , x j−1 , x j+1 , . . . , x m ). Now, the signature on X under the public key (A, b, c, n) is the same as the signature on X\(x j ) under the public key (A\(a j ), b, c/a xj j , n), i.e., Sign (A,b,c,n,p) (X) = (v, e, s) = Sign (A\(aj ),b,c/a x j j ,n,p) (X \ (x j )). This holds for any sub-tuple Y of X. We will use this property in our coupon system to redeem a single coupon from a multiple set of coupons.
Remark 2.
As discovered in [7] , the CL signature scheme has the property of randomisation, i.e., the signature (v, e, s) can be randomised to (T = vb w , e, s * = s − ew) with an arbitrary w. From a verifier's point of view, (T, e, s * ) and (v, e, s) are equivalent since they both are signatures on X. This property benefits our scheme because proving (T, e, s ) is much more efficient than proving (v, e, s) in an anonymous manner.
Proofs of Relations between Committed Numbers
For the construction of our coupon system, we need several sub-protocols in order to prove certain relations between committed numbers [18, 10, 1, 13, 28] . These are proofs of knowledge (PoK ) where the commitments are formed using the DF scheme. We will now briefly state the various protocols that we employ. The output of each of the protocols for the verifier is ind V ∈ {accept, reject}.
PoKRep.
A prover P proves knowledge of a discrete logarithm representation (DLRep) modulo a composite to a verifier V. Common inputs are a description of group G, PK := (g 1 , . . . , g m , h) with h, g i ∈ G, and a commitment C. By this protocol, P convinces V of knowledge of X := (
PoKEqRep. A prover P proves to a verifier V knowledge of equality of representations of elements from possibly different groups G 1 , G 2 . Common inputs are PK 1 := (g 1 , . . . , g m , h), g i , h ∈ G 1 , PK 2 := (g 1 , . . . , g m , h ), g i , h ∈ G 2 , commitments C 1 ∈ G 1 and C 2 ∈ G 2 . By running the protocol, P convinces V of knowledge of
m).
PoKInt. A prover P proves to a verifier V knowledge of x and r such that C = g x h r and a ≤ x ≤ b. Common inputs are parameters (g, h, n), the commitment C, and the integers a, b. We use a straightforward extension to the basic protocol, such that the proved knowledge is two tuples, instead of two values, and the interval membership of one tuple, instead of one value. Within this extension, we denote G := (g 1 , g 2 , ..., g m ), H := (h 1 , h 2 , ..., h l ), X := (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x m ), R := (r 1 , r 2 , ..., r l ),
By running the protocol, P proves to V knowledge of X and R, and the interval membership, a ≤ x i ≤ b.
PoKOr. A prover P proves to a verifier V an OR statement of a commitment C, such that C := (C 1 , . . . , C m ), where C i := j∈αi g xij j h ri and α i ⊆ {1, ..., m}, and P knows at least one tuple {x ij | j ∈ α i } for some undisclosed i. We denote the OR statement as
Common inputs are C and parameters (G, n) where G : = (g 1 , . . . , g m ). By running the protocol, P proves to V knowledge of {x ij | j ∈ α i } without revealing the values x ij and i. A number of mechanisms for proving the "OR" statement have been given in [6, 13, 28] .
PoK. Sometimes, we need to carry out two or more of the above protocols simultaneously, e.g., when responses to challenges have to be used in more than one validity check of the verifier to prove intermingled relations among commitments. Instead of giving concrete constructions of these protocols each time, we just describe their aim, i.e., what the verifier wants to prove. For this we apply the notation used, e.g., in [10] . For instance, the following expression
means that knowledge of α and β is proven such that C = g α h ρ and D =ĝ αĥβ holds, and α lies in the integer interval [0, 2 k ).
Blind Signatures and Signature Proof
BlindSign. Next we state a secure protocol for signing a blinded tuple shown in Figure  1 , which is based on [9, 5] . In this protocol, a user U obtains a signature from the signer S on a tuple X := (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) without revealing X to S. We assume that S has the public key PK := (A, b, c, n), the secret key SK := p, and public length parameters n , x , e , e , s , and φ which are parameters controlling the statistical zeroknowledge property of the employed PoK . U's input to the protocol is the message X := (x 1 , . . . , x m ) for which U wants to obtain a signature. If all proofs are accepted, S chooses a prime e and computes v := (c/(
. At the end, V sends the resulting tuple (v, e, s ) to U. Finally, U sets s := (s + s ) and obtains (v, e, s) as the desired signature on X. We denote this protocol for blindly signing a tuple by (v, e, s) ← BlindSign (PK ) (X). without V learning anything of the signature but its validity. The common inputs are the same as in the BlindSign protocol. P's secret input is the message X and the corresponding signature (v, e, s). The protocol works as follows: P first randomises the signature components, v and s, by choosing w at random and computing T := vb w and s * = s − ew. P sends only T to V. Then, P proves to V his knowledge specified in PoK .
As discussed in Remark 2 of Section 4.2, in V's view, (T, e, s ) is a valid signature on X as the same as (v, e, s). The difference between them is that we are allowed to reveal the value T but not the value v to V because T is different in every proof. Therefore, to prove the signature with c ≡ v ; (3) PoKInt: to prove the value e is also within a right bound, i.e., (e − 2 e ) ∈ {0, 1} e + φ +1 .
Construction of the Coupon System
In this section we propose a concrete scheme for a coupon system that allows issuance and redemption of multi-coupons. The scheme is comprised of two protocols, Issue and 
. , am)
Length parameters x, e, e , φ Prover's Input:
Message X := (x1, . . . , xm), Signature (v, e, s) Fig. 2 . Protocol for proving knowledge of a signature: PoKSign Redeem, which are carried out between a user U and a vendor V, and an Initialisation algorithm.
Initialisation. V initialises the system by generating a key pair PK = (A, b, c, n) where A = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m ) and SK = p. The vendor keeps SK secret and publishes PK with length parameters x , e , e , n , s , and the security parameter φ .
Issue. In the issue protocol, U chooses serial numbers x i ∈ R {1, . . . , 2 x − 1} (i = 1 . . . m) and sets X := (x 1 , . . . , x m ). Then U runs (v, e, s) ← BlindSign (PK ) (X) with V to obtain a blind CL signature (v, e, s) on X. The tuple M := (X, v, e, s) will act as the user's multi-coupon.
Redeem. In the redeem protocol, U (randomly) chooses an unspent coupon x j from the tuple X and sets x := x j and X := X \(x). The value x then becomes a common input to the redeem protocol. Next U proves to V that she is in possession of a valid multi-coupon (V's signature on X) containing x without revealing the signature itself.
In addition, we have the restriction that the index information of x, i.e. j, should not be disclosed to V when proving that x is part of the signed message in the CL signature. Otherwise, V will be able to break the unlinkability property. For instance, simply suppose that two coupons x and y are revealed both with respect to the base a j from the CL signature. Then V immediately learns that the corresponding multicoupons are different. Our solution is to prove the CL signature (v, e, s) for the tuple X under the public key (A\(a j ), b, c/a x j , n) without revealing the signature, the signed message X , and the index j.
To accommodate this redeem protocol, U runs a modified version of the PoKSign protocol from Figure 2 . The goal of this modified protocol is, firstly, to prove knowledge of a CL signature and, secondly, to prove that the value x is part of this signature without revealing the index j. Note that if disclosing j to the vendor would not violate unlinkability, both proofs could be easily done by using Remark 1 from section 4.2 and giving x as well as its index j to the vendor V. In this case V could compute a modified public key PK j := (A \ (a j ), b, c/a
In order to overcome this problem, we proceed as follows: Instead of disclosing to V which concrete PK i (i = 1 . . . m) is to be used for the verification, U proves that one of the public keys PK i is the correct one with respect to the signature (v, e, s) on the message X . For this, the proof PoK is extended with the PoKOr protocol which additionally proves the term In PoKOr , U proves that she knows the DLRep of one of the C i with respect to its corresponding basis (T, A \ (a i ), b) without revealing which one: since x is equal to x j , the commitment C j = c/a x j must have a representation to basis (T, A\(a j ), b), which is known to U. Note that this additionally proves knowledge of the signature (T = vb w , e, s * = s − ew) with respect to the public key PK j := (A\(a j ), b, c/a x j ). This is according to Remark 1 the same as proving it with respect to the public key (A, b, c) and by remark 2 is, from V's point of view, equivalent to the signature (v, e, s) .
If the proof protocol yields accept then V is convinced that U owns a signature on an m-tuple X which contains x. Finally, V checks if x is already stored in his database of redeemed coupons. If it is not, V accepts x as a valid coupon and will grant the service.
Properties
In the following, we sketch how the coupon system proposed in the previous subsection satisfies the requirements from section 3.1. We will analyse the security of the system assuming that the strong RSA assumption holds.
Unforgeability. The property of unforgeability of our coupon system follows from the unforgeability of the CL signature scheme. As described in the previous section, a set of multiple-coupons is a single CL signature on a block of messages. As has been proved in [9] , forging CL signatures would break the strong RSA assumption.
Resetting the number of spent coupons requires to change some component in the tuple X, e.g., replacing a redeemed coupon x i with x i = x i , since the vendor stores each spent single coupon x i . However, replacing x i by x i , yielding tuple X , must be done such that Sign (·) (X) = Sign (·) (X ). Suppose the latter can be done. Then, we get ≡ 1 mod n. Since x i = x i it must be the case that x i − x i = α · ord(Z n ). Now, choose any e such that 1 < e < (x i − x i ) and gcd(e, x i − x i ) = 1. By the extended Euclidean algorithm we can find d such that ed + (x i − x i )t = 1. Using this, we can compute e-th roots in Z n . For this, let u be any value from Z * n and compute
mod n, the value w is an e-th root of u. This means we would have found a way to break the strong RSA assumption. Since this is assumed to be infeasible x i cannot be replaced by x i = x i without changing the signature (v, e, s). Double-spending detection. If a cheating user tries to redeem an already spent single coupon x i , she will be caught at the end of the redeem protocol, since the coupon to be redeemed must be disclosed and, thus, can easily be looked up in the vendor's database.
Redemption limitation. An m-redeemable coupon M cannot be redeemed more than m times (without the vendor's consent). Each multi-coupon M contains a signature on an m-tuple (x 1 , . . . , x m ) of single coupons and in each run of the issue protocol a single coupon x i is disclosed. Thus, after m honest runs using the same M , all x i will be disclosed to the vendor. As argued under unforgeability and double-spending detection, already redeemed x i cannot be replaced by fresh x i and any attempt to 'reuse' an already disclosed x i will be caught by the double-spending check.
Weak protection against splitting. Suppose that two users U 1 and U 2 want to share multi-coupon M := (X, v, e, s) such that U 1 receives single coupons X 1 := {x 1 , . . . , x i } and U 2 receives the remaining coupons X 2 := {x j , . . . , x m }, i < j. To achieve splitting, they have to find a way to make sure that U 1 is able to redeem all x j ∈ X 1 while not being able to redeem any coupon x j ∈ X 2 , and analogously for U 2 . However, in the redeem protocol it is necessary to prove knowledge of the DLRep of C X , which is X. Since proving knowledge of X while knowing only X 1 or X 2 would violate the soundness of the employed proof of knowledge PoKRep, and hence violate the strong RSA assumption, this is believed to be infeasible. Again, the missing part of X, either X 1 or X 2 , cannot be replaced by 'fake' coupons X 1|2 since this violates the unforgeability property of t he coupon system. Hence, X cannot be split and can only be shared if both U 1 and U 2 have full knowledge of X which comes down to all-or-nothing sharing.
Unlinkability. For unlinkability, we have to consider two cases, unlinkability between issue and redeem protocol runs and between executions of the issue protocol.
(1) issue vs. redeem: The issue protocol is identical to the protocol BlindSign and, hence, the vendor V, acting as signer, does not learn anything about the message X being signed. However, V has partial knowledge of the signature (v, e, s), i.e., at the end of the issue protocol since he knows (v, e) but not s. To exploit this knowledge, he would have to recognize v or e in a run of the redeem protocol. In the redeem protocol, however, the user only sends commitments T and C i (i = 1 . . . m) to V. Since the commitment scheme is statistically hiding the vendor cannot learn anything about v or e from the commitments.
Furthermore, all sub-protocols in Redeem operate only on the commitments T and C i and since the opening information of either T or any C i is never given to V during the execution of any of these proof protocols the vendor is unable to recognise v or e. (2) redeem vs. redeem: The redeem protocol mainly consists of the PoKSign protocol which only employs zero-knowledge proofs and statistically hiding commitments and, hence, is unlinkable. However, in the redeem protocol the coupon value x is given to the vendor V, i.e., the verifier. In the following we sketch that V cannot use this information to infer other information that helps him to link redemptions of single coupons?
To see this, let τ be the transcript of the redeem protocol where x is released. Since all proofs of knowledge applied in the redeem protocol perform challenge-response protocols, there will be some values u, containing x, which were formed by the user in response to challenges t chosen by V. The general form of a response is u = ty + r, where t is V's challenge, y is some committed value of which knowledge is proven, and r is a witness randomly chosen by the user. However, since x's index is not revealed (due to PoKOr ) every response u i (i = 1 . . . m) is equally likely to contain x. Now, if V guesses x's index, say j, he would only learn the value r j from the response u j . However, this reveals no information of any other response u i , i = j, from τ , since for any value x i , contained in the response u i , the witness r i is randomly and uniformly chosen anew for each u i . Hence, from V's point of view u i is a random value and may contain any value x i and, thus, x i is (still) statistically hidden in u i .
The consequence of the arguments mentioned above is that given any two redeem protocol transcripts τ (x) and τ (y) where x and y are deducted from (hidden) multicoupons M (x) and N (y)
, respectively, the verifier cannot determine whether x is hidden in any response u (y) i from τ (y) and analogously if y is hidden in any u . This means the vendor cannot decide with a non-negligible probability better than pure guessing if the multi-coupons M (x) and N (y) are related or unrelated.
Minimum disclosure. A further consequence of the unlinkability of transactions in the coupon system, and due to the fact that no counter value is sent in any protocol, the number of unspent coupons cannot be inferred from any redeem protocol run.
Conclusion
The coupon system presented in this work allows vendors to issue multi-coupons to their customers, where each single coupon of such a multi-coupon can be redeemed at the vendor's in exchange for some good, e.g., an MP3 file, or some service, e.g., access to commercial online articles of a newspaper. Issuing coupons is advantageous to vendors since coupons effectively retain customers as long as they have coupons left to spent. However, multi-coupons might be misused by vendors to link transactions of customers in order to collect and compile information from their transactions in a profile. To protect the privacy of customers in this respect, the coupon system that we proposed allows customers to unlinkably redeem single coupons while preserving security requirements of vendors.
